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Strengthening Charity Law:
Replacing Media Oversight with Advance
Rulings for Nonprofit Fiduciaries
Linda Sugin*
This Article considers three urgent challenges facing the charitable community and its
state regulators: too little fiduciary duty law for nonprofits, the rise of media enforcement of
wrongdoing in charities, and an inherent tension in the state’s dual role as enforcer and protector
of the nonprofit sector. It analyzes whether the scarcity of law is really a problem by comparing
nonprofit organizations with business organizations and concludes that charities lack the selfenforcement mechanisms of businesses and therefore need more government guidance. It
evaluates whether the media has made governmental supervision obsolete and expresses
skepticism about the press displacing state oversight. The solution presented, an advance-ruling
procedure for fiduciary duty questions, proposes that states shift their focus from better
enforcement against wrongdoers ex post to better charity governance ex ante by devoting more
attention and resources to assisting well-meaning charity directors in carrying out their fiduciary
obligations.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are on the board of trustees1 of a charity. The
executive director reports that the organization is in terrible financial
trouble. She presents several options: sell off long-held assets owned
by the organization and use the proceeds to make ends meet;
drastically reduce services and programming that the organization
provides; borrow money and increase the organization’s ongoing
obligations and risk; or merge with another, larger organization that
will ultimately obliterate the unique character of the charity. All seem
undesirable to you, and you do not know if you are obligated to choose
any particular one. Alternatively, consider your response if the
executive director reports positive results for the organization’s
operations and proposes a massive expansion of the organization’s
activities and scope that will fundamentally change the nature of the
charity’s services and operations. You are nervous about the
organization taking on new risks and are concerned about its
relationship with current beneficiaries and the community. But it is
not clear to you whether the risk is responsible or whether you are in a
position to protect current beneficiaries and the community (or if you
should). Finally, imagine instead that the executive director’s proposal
involves business dealings between the organization and another
member of the board or a relative of the executive director. Something
may not smell right to you about the proposal, but if the price seems
fair, you may not be able to put your finger on what it is.
These issues are common for nonprofit fiduciaries, but solving
them requires nuance and judgment. If you are like most people who
volunteer to serve on charity boards, you want to do the right thing for
the organization and the community. You volunteered because you
believe in the charity’s mission and want to support it.2 But there is a
good chance that you do not know the right thing to do under the law.
The legal obligations of charity boards are not widely known or easy to
discover, and state attorneys general (AG)—who are responsible for
the oversight of charities—have numerous other responsibilities
demanding their time and resources. So the people who run charities
often muddle along, doing their best, without much legal guidance.

1.
This Article will refer to “trustees” and “directors” interchangeably. They are the
people on the governing board of a charity, whatever its form. Charities can have various
state law forms, including both trusts and corporations.
See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
2.
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Those who think of the nonprofits as superfluous—a bonus on
top of the essential government and business sectors—may be satisfied
with mediocrity in the nonprofit world. But they should not be.
Nonprofits play a crucial role in the economic, social, and cultural life
of society.3 Well-functioning charities are needed to provide a broad
array of public and private goods, including social services, higher
education, and the arts. Nonprofits address important public needs,
even though they are privately managed. States have an interest in the
effective operation of charities because the better charities are run, the
more they can contribute to their public missions and overall social
welfare.4 States have an interest in good charity governance because
they have an interest in good charitable services. Unlike business
organizations, which bring tax revenue and economic spillover into a
state,5 a state’s charities bring a higher quality of life to the people of
the state.
This Article considers three urgent challenges facing the
nonprofit community and its state regulators: too little fiduciary duty
law for nonprofits, the rise of media enforcement of wrongdoing in
charities, and the inherent tension in the state’s dual role of enforcer
and protector in the nonprofit sector—what I call the “confidentiality
paradox.” First, there are surprisingly few cases concerning fiduciary
obligations of nonprofit directors.6 Scholars who would adopt
3.
In 2010, public charities reported $1.51 trillion in revenue and $2.71 trillion in
assets. See Amy S. Blackwood, Katie L. Roeger & Sarah L. Pettijohn, The Nonprofit Sector
in Brief: Public Charities, Giving, and Volunteering, 2012, URBAN INST. 1 (2012),
http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/412674-The-Nonprofit-Sector-In-Brief.pdf. Nonprofits
paid 9.2% of all wages and salaries in 2010. See Quick Facts About Nonprofits, NAT’L
CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STAT., http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2015).
4.
In order to qualify for tax exemption, charities must be “organized and operated
exclusively” for public purposes defined in the statute. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
5.
Delaware has attracted a disproportionate share of business organizations, which
produce substantial franchise tax revenue for the small state. There is no similar competition
among states for charities. See Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the
Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1161-62 (2007).
6.
My research revealed only the following published cases finding breaches and
applying remedies: Boston Children’s Heart Foundation, Inc. v. Nadal-Ginard, 73 F.3d 429
(1st Cir. 1996); Lifespan Corp. v. New England Medical Center, Inc., No. 06-cv-421-JNL,
2011 WL 2134286 (D.R.I. May 24, 2011); Aramony v. United Way of America, 28 F. Supp.
2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for
Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974); Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420
N.E.2d 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Shepard of the Valley Lutheran Church of Hastings v. Hope
Lutheran Church of Hastings, 626 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); State ex rel. Little
People’s Child Development Center, Inc. v. Little People’s Child Development Center, Inc.,
No. M2007-00345-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 103509 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2009); Summers v.
Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Marist

872

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:869

business law principles into the law of nonprofit organizations fail to
see a problem of too little law because they would borrow from
business law precedent.7 But in the context of fiduciary duties,
business law is woefully inapt for nonprofits.8
Second, the proliferation of charity-rating and monitoring
institutions9 has altered the landscape from legal to nonlegal oversight
for charities. Private watchdogs, along with the media, have become
the most important enforcers of charity fiduciary behavior. In some
cases, the media leads while the state authorities follow with
enforcement action, but sometimes, media enforcement supplants
governmental oversight altogether.10 For individuals involved in
charity misdeeds, media enforcement is a shaming remedy. Shaming
may be effective in controlling the behavior of some fiduciaries, but
we should be skeptical about its equity and efficiency. The media may
get the standards wrong, may sensationalize stories to grab attention,
and may yield net negative effects on the charitable sector and society
as a whole.11 The privatization of legal standards threatens the states’
control over the definitions of good charity governance and
wrongdoing, and it is imperative that states reassert their crucial role.
Third, a confidentiality paradox exists because there is a tension
inherent in the charities enforcement work of the AG between
effectiveness in a particular case and usefulness to the charitable sector
as a whole. Confidentiality is good for a charity under investigation,
but bad for others who would learn from its mistakes. Unlike the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which regulates charities in the course
of policing their tax exemptions, state AGs are protectors of the

College v. Nicklin, No. 01-94-00849-CV, 1995 WL 241710 (Tex. App. Apr. 27, 1995); and
John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 795 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
7.
I have previously written about why business law fails to suit the policies of
charity law. See Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance:
Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893 (2007).
8.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
See, e.g., BBB WISE GIVING ALLIANCE, http://give.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2015);
9.
CHARITY NAVIGATOR, http://www.charitynavigator.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); CHARITY
WATCH, http://www.charitywatch.org/home (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); GiveWell Blog,
GIVEWELL, http://blog.givewell.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); Watchdog, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV., http://www.ssireview.org/blog/category/watchdog (last visited Mar. 1,
2015).
10. See, e.g., Kathleen Teltsch, United Way Awaits Inquiry on Its President’s
Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/24/us/united-wayawaits-inquiry-on-its-president-s-practices.html (stating that William Aramony’s behavior had
been uncovered in “several publications”).
11. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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charitable sector.12 The state’s role is as parens patriae,13 so its object in
overseeing charities is to protect the public good.14 Effectiveness in AG
enforcement implies preservation of charitable assets. These goals
often counsel secrecy and settlement by the state with a charity under
investigation without legal enforcement proceedings. Where the AG
can reform a charity and improve its governance by demanding
internal changes in structure, process, or policies, confidentiality is
desirable so that the charity suffers no loss of donors or public
embarrassment. Except in the rare situation in which a charity is
fraudulent at its core,15 or there is no public benefit that it provides, a
targeted remedy that corrects a problem is best for minimizing damage
to a particular charity’s mission and perhaps to the reputation of the
charitable sector as a whole. Unfortunately, secrecy and unpublished
settlement are prime causes of the lack of law. If participants in the
charitable sector—particularly lawyers—had greater knowledge of
both the issues raised in AG investigations and the solutions designed
with the input of the state, they would be in a better position to advise
nonprofit boards on how to behave.
Improving charity governance requires balancing diverse
concerns for individual organizations, the charitable sector, and the
public at large. Even with scarce resources, states need to create more
law for nonprofits, so innovation in lawmaking is essential. This
Article proposes that states shift their focus from better enforcement
against wrongdoers ex post to better governance ex ante16 by devoting

12. See Karen Gano, The Fundamental Role of the States in Governance Issues,
COLUM. U. ACAD. COMMONS 1, 3 n.4 (2013), academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/
ac%3A168598.
13. Latin for “parent of the nation,” which in the legal context refers to the state
having standing to sue on behalf of its citizens. See id. at 1 (“The Attorney General’s duty
arises from the responsibility of the parens patriae as representative of the indefinite members
of the public—the public at large—who are the beneficiaries of property devoted to
charitable purposes.” (emphasis added)).
14. A visit to any state AG’s website describes their role as protecting the “public
good.” See, e.g., N.Y. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.ag.ny.gov (last visited Mar. 1, 2015);
Protecting Consumers, ILL. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/consumers/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
15. See, e.g., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $500k Settlement and the Shuttering of
Three Long Island Sham Charities and Their Professional Fundraiser, N.Y. ATT’Y GEN. (Feb.
4, 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-500k-settlementand-shuttering-three-long-island-sham (“[T]he charities were shell organizations run
primarily for the benefit of the fundraiser and the charities’ officers, and that less than 4
percent of the money raised went to any charitable purpose.”).
16. This is consistent with the approach of the Leadership Committee for Nonprofit
Revitalization. Leadership Committee for Nonprofit Revitalization, Report to Attorney
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more attention (and resources) to assisting well-meaning charity
directors in carrying out their fiduciary obligations.
The next section, Part II, describes the minimal legal enforcement
of fiduciary obligations in nonprofit organizations. It analyzes
whether the scarcity of law is really a problem by comparing nonprofit
organizations with business organizations. Part III considers the
media’s role in oversight of nonprofit governance and explains how the
importance of reputation in the charities world has allowed the media
to effectively displace legal authorities. It evaluates whether the media
has made governmental oversight obsolete and expresses skepticism
about the press displacing state enforcement. Part IV suggests a
solution to the identified challenges by advocating an AG-based
advance-ruling process for fiduciary duty questions, modeled on the
private letter ruling procedure administered by the IRS. It argues that
such a process would be an equitable and efficient alternative to media
enforcement, would create a body of useful legal advice, and would be
preferable to other suggestions in the literature for addressing the
problem of inadequate charitable fiduciary oversight. Part V briefly
concludes.
II.

WHERE IS THE LAW IN NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE?

A. What Is Charity Law?
Charity law consists of both federal law and state law.
Organizations are subject to substantial regulation in the federal tax
law in order to be eligible for exemption. Only organizations
qualifying as charities may receive tax-deductible contributions from
donors,17 so they are the gold standard for tax-exempt institutions. The
IRS provides that charities may not pay profits out to individuals (the
“inurement” prohibition), must be organized and operated for a
statutorily-enumerated purpose, and are restricted in their political
activities.18 Much of the federal law applies to activities by
organizations, but such regulation necessarily implicates the behavior
of the individuals who control them. As the tax enforcer, the IRS is
responsible for policing the boundaries of charitable organizations.

General Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. ATT’Y GEN. 23-34 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ag.ny.gov/
sites/default/files/NP%20Leadership%20Committee%20Report%20%282-16-12%29.pdf.
17. I.R.C. § 170 (2012).
18. Id. § 501(c)(3). There are organizations that are exempt from tax, but are not
charities. See id. § 501(c).
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State law directly regulates the behavior of nonprofit directors,
imposing fiduciary duties on individuals who are in control of
charitable organizations.19 While the precise terms of law differ across
states, all states mandate that charity directors exercise care in their
decision making20 and elevate the interests of the charity over their
personal interests, if they ever conflict.21 In addition, individuals in
charge of charities have an obligation to carry out a charitable
mission.22 These fiduciary concepts are vague, and governing
charitable organizations is not easy.23 Not only has the number of
organizations grown in recent years,24 but the complexity of their
structures and operations has increased as well.25
States do not dictate “how to ‘do’ charity,”26 but state AGs oversee
charity behavior; they are responsible for enforcing the obligations of
loyalty, care, and obedience that fiduciaries have under the laws of
19. See Jenkins, supra note 5, at 1126-27; see also N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW
§ 717(a) (2014) (imposing fiduciary duties on leaders of charitable organizations).
20. New York law provides a succinct definition for care: “Directors and officers
shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith and with the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.”
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a). To satisfy the obligation, “trustees must
affirmatively exercise discretion and make a deliberate judgment.” J. Edward Meyer et al.,
Report to the New York Board of Regents on Adelphi University Trustees, IND. UNIV.-PURDUE
UNIV. INDIANAPOLIS 16 (Feb. 5, 1997), https://folio.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/502/
THE%20COMMITTEE%20TO%20SAVE%20ADELPHI.pdf?sequence=1.
21. See DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 59
(1988) (“The basic duty of loyalty . . . requires a director to have an undivided allegiance to
the organization’s mission . . . when using either the power of his position or information he
possesses concerning the organization or its property.”). The famous quote in the corporate
context, equally applicable to nonprofits, is Judge Cardozo’s description of the duty as “[n]ot
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164
N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act requires that directors act
“in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the nonprofit
corporation.” MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2) (2008).
22. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 428 (2004). While some scholars dispute the
separate obligation of obedience, I have previously argued for it. See Sugin, supra note 7.
23. See Evelyn Brody, The Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 243, 244 (Walter W. Powell & Richard
Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“[I]t is not easy to say what ‘the law’ is in the nonprofit sector.”).
24. The number of public charities registered with the IRS increased 42% from 2000
through 2010, to almost a million organizations. Blackwood, Roeger & Pettijohn, supra note
3, at 2. In 2010, the entire nonprofit sector—which includes private and public charities,
small organizations not required to register, religious organizations, and other noncharitable
nonprofits—exceeded 2.3 million organizations. See id. at 1-2, 4.
25. See John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 489 (2002) (“[I]t is now common to find charities engaged in
numerous economic activities through a variety of business arrangements including
subsidiary corporations, joint ventures, and contractual agreements.”).
26. Brody, supra note 23, at 243.
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every state.27 The AG’s burden is great because very few other parties
are allowed to bring suit to enforce these duties.28 AG charities offices
are underfunded and understaffed, and they have not grown at the rate
of the sector itself.29 Consequently, deliberate malfeasance by charity
insiders can often proceed undetected by AGs. At the same time, wellmeaning directors receive little guidance and assistance from the AGs
in carrying out their obligations. Honest trustees often lack the
knowledge and judgment necessary to carry out their legal obligations
of careful attention30 and fidelity31 to the organizations that they serve.
In many states, there is virtually no easily accessible information to
guide fiduciaries in their roles.32 To confuse things further for charity
directors and state regulators, the IRS has encroached on the states’
traditional role in overseeing nonprofit governance, even though it may
not have the legal authority to preempt the states’ traditional functions
and despite its questionable suitability for the task.33

B.

Legal Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties Is Minimal

The lack of law stems from both the dearth of decided cases that
specifically involve charities and the scarcity of specific rules and
standards applicable to charities in many states. Some states have no
unique charity law at all, creating the impression either that charities
are somehow beyond the law or that there is nothing unique about the
law of charities compared to the law of other institutions.34 While the
27. See Gano, supra note 12, at 1, 14-15.
28. In addition to the AG, directors have standing to bring suit for violations of
fiduciary duties, but beneficiaries and donors generally do not. See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled
Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries? 23 J. CORP. L.
655 (1998). Many fiduciary duty cases are dismissed for lack of standing. See infra note 46
and accompanying text.
29. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 22, at 445.
30. See id. at 199-205 (defining the duty of care as including paying attention to the
corporation’s affairs).
31. See Sugin, supra note 7, at 902 (describing the duty of obedience as a “more
abstract fiduciary duty” of fidelity).
32. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
33. See James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate
Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545 (2010); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M.
Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis,
85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479 (2010); Marcus S. Owens, Charities and Governance: Is the IRS
Subject to Challenge?, 60 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 287 (2008), available at http://www.
lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/ (select “Advanced Options”; type “Tax Analysts
Exempt Organization Tax Review Magazine” into the “Source” section; then search for
“Charities and Governance: Is the IRS Subject to Challenge”).
34. Sophisticated lawyers would advise New York charities to incorporate in
Delaware because it has no separate law. See Jenkins, supra note 5.
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law of charities overlaps with the law of trusts and the law of business
corporations, there are unique characteristics of charitable
organizations that demand specific law. Those characteristics were
apparent to the drafters of the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses, and the
increasing complexity of charities’ structures and operations today
makes legal rules even more important now.
Published opinions concerning the fiduciary duties of individuals
who control nonprofit organizations are few, and cases holding
directors liable for breach are scarce. While directors have obligations
of loyalty, care, and (maybe) obedience,35 states enforcing fiduciary
duties concentrate on the duty of loyalty, which demands that
fiduciaries refrain from using their positions to improperly obtain
personal benefits.36 The emphasis on loyalty is not surprising given
that violations of loyalty are the clearest example of charity abuse.
Courts have found the duty breached when there is clear self-dealing
by the director that enriches the director at the expense of the charity.37
In some cases, large monetary penalties have been imposed on the
breaching parties and awarded to the organization.38 These penalties
punish the wrongdoer, make the organization whole, and serve as a
warning to future directors not to engage in self-dealing.
Occasionally, an organization may be dissolved for self-dealing.39
Though a dramatic remedy, dissolution may be desirable where there is
no public purpose or charitable activities to be preserved by keeping
the organization alive. In the most egregious fraud cases, individuals
may create an organization for nothing but self-enrichment, so the
purpose of the organization is not really charitable at all, but exists
35. See Sugin, supra note 7, at 896-904 (discussing the duty of obedience as a “the
stepchild to the duties of care and loyalty within the nonprofit cannon”).
36. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 163 (4th ed. 2010).
37. See Bos. Children’s Heart Found., Inc. v. Nadal-Ginard, 73 F.3d 429 (1st Cir.
1996); State ex rel. Little People’s Child Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Little People’s Child Dev. Ctr., Inc.,
No. M2007-00345-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 103509 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2009); Summers v.
Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Marist
Coll. v. Nicklin, No. 01-94-00849-CV, 1995 WL 241710 (Tex. App. Apr. 27, 1995); John v.
John, 450 N.W.2d 795 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
38. See Bos. Children’s, 73 F.3d at 431, 443 (awarding judgments in favor of Boston
Children’s Heart Foundation for $6,562,283.02); Little People’s, 2009 WL 103509, at *11
(awarding judgment against defendants for $1,782,666.00); Marist Coll., 1995 WL 241710,
at *2 (awarding the college a total of $19,825.22, with $8,189.76 coming from the defendant,
Nicklin, directly); see also John, 450 N.W.2d at 797-98 (enjoining an officer from serving as
the organization’s director in the future and requiring them to pay a monetary sum of
$1,171,418.00 plus interest).
39. See Summers, 112 S.W.3d at 531.
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only to siphon funds from the charitable sector into private hands. The
Coalition Against Breast Cancer, which managed to raise substantial
sums from donors, is a good example. It was “a sham charity that
ha[d] diverted nearly all of the millions of dollars raised in the name of
breast cancer to its officers, directors and fundraisers.”40 In its
complaint, the New York AG demanded the organization’s
dissolution.41
Despite these examples, director liability is unusual, and in cases
involving breach of care alone, it is exceptional.42 Care is more likely
to be enforced if it is accompanied by a breach of loyalty than if it
constitutes gross negligence with inchoate consequences for the
organization.43 The combination care-loyalty pattern is predictable,
and the harm from failure to exercise care is more concrete where it is
an accessory to a loyalty breach—a powerful insider steals from an
organization (loyalty) and the directors charged with monitoring him
are not paying attention (care), so the charity’s losses are undetected,
prolonged, and/or large. If an organization has any directors who were
not involved in the self-dealing that occurred, they presumably failed
in their oversight role. But it is unusual for the negligent directors,
who enjoyed no personal financial benefits from the wrongdoing, to
be personally liable for the losses. New York’s settlement with
Educational Housing Services (EHS) and its directors is a recent
example of this combination: while the founder siphoned money from
the organization, the rest of the directors failed to stop him.44 The EHS
40. Gary Snyder, This Breast Cancer Fraud Has It All, NONPROFIT IMPERATIVE (July
21, 2011), http://nonprofitimperative.blogspot.com/2011/07/this-breast-cancer-fraud-has-itall.html.
41. Complaint, State v. Coal. Against Breast Cancer, Inc. (No. 20432-2011), http://
www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/2011/Summons%20and%20Complaint.pdf.
42. Because care violations are often alleged coincident with loyalty violations, it is
often hard to differentiate the remedies for each. Monetary liability for a care violation alone
is rare, though there are a few cases. See, e.g., Lifespan Corp. v. New Eng. Med. Ctr., Inc.,
No. 06-cv-421-JNL, 2011 WL 2134286 (D.R.I. May 24, 2011) (awarding a $272,756
judgment for care violation); Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App.
1970); In re Estate of Donner, 626 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1993) (finding a trustee guilty of a care
violation).
43. See Aramony v. United Way of Am., 28 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding
breaches of both care and loyalty and entering judgments against directors); Stern v. Lucy
Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C.
1974) (same); Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (resolving a suit
against a nonprofit director on the theory of corporate veil piercing without addressing the
director’s fiduciary responsibilities of loyalty and care); John, 450 N.W.2d 795 (finding
breaches of both care and loyalty and entering judgments against directors).
44. Assurance of Discontinuance, N.Y. ATT’Y GEN. 1-5 (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.
ag.ny.gov/pdfs/EHS_AOD.pdf.
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case is unusual because the negligent directors agreed to pay $850,000
in damages for their breach of fiduciary duties to the organization,
even though they had not financially benefitted.45
Notwithstanding some enforcement successes at the
administrative stage or in litigation, individual plaintiffs generally lose
in charity fiduciary duties actions. Because AGs are the only party
with undisputed standing to sue, courts commonly dismiss fiduciary
breach cases for lack of standing.46 Where plaintiffs are permitted to
proceed, some courts have concluded that the defendant owed no
fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs, based on an analysis of the relationship
between the parties in the dispute.47 Other cases hold that the directors
have acted within the appropriate bounds of their fiduciary duties,48
which are broad because the “best judgment rule” protects nonprofit
managers from liability for mistakes in judgment if they act in good
faith, with sufficient care, and without conflicts of interest.49 Even
where plaintiffs prevail, the remedies for gross negligence may be
weak: in a leading care case, the court ordered future trustees of an
organization to read his opinion explaining why the directors involved
in the case were grossly negligent in carrying out their obligations.50
45. See id. at 7.
46. See, e.g., Wisdom v. Centerville Fire Dist., Inc., 391 F. App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2010);
Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Askew v. Trs. of the Gen.
Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d
584 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Koch v. Ironwood Country Club, No. E030460, 2002 WL 1965466 (Cal.
Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2002); George Pepperdine Found. v. Pepperdine, 271 P.2d 600 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1954); O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398 (Md. 1994); Grand Council of Ohio v.
Owens, 620 N.E.2d 234 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Lundberg v. Lascelles, No. 59178-9-I, 2007
WL 4157779 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2007).
47. The relationship between the parties is analyzed and found to be one not
requiring fiduciary duties. See Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008);
Olson v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., No. B201428, 2009 WL 1039573 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20,
2009); Fine Iron Works v. La. World Exposition, Inc., 472 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1985);
State ex rel. Boone v. Sundquist, 884 S.W.2d 438 (Tenn. 1994).
48. See S. Bay Rod & Gun Club v. Dashiell, No. D053658, 2009 WL 4547032 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2009); Murrell v. Crocker, No. B190152, 2007 WL 1839478 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 28, 2007); In re Northridge Earthquake Commercial Litig. (Farmers Grp.), No.
B170128, 2004 WL 1832970 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2004); White v. Bd. of Dirs. of St.
Elizabeth Baptist Church, 42,903-CA (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/9/08); 974 So. 2d 164; Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 2005).
49. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 36, at 152-53. The best judgment rule is
the nonprofit corollary to the business judgment rule in corporate law.
50. The order reads:
Ordered that each present trustee of Sibley Memorial Hospital and each
future trustee selected during the next five years shall, within two weeks of this
Order or promptly after election to the Board, read this Order and the attached
Memorandum Opinion and shall signify in writing or by notation in the minutes of
a Board meeting that he or she has done so . . . .
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While the judge was innovative, as a punishment for wrongdoing, the
remedy was undeniably pathetic. At best, enforcement of charity
fiduciary duties is exceedingly modest, and few cases produce useful
lessons for fiduciaries to follow.

C.

Can Business Law Fill the Gap in Charities Fiduciary Law?

One possible solution to the problem of too little law for
nonprofit organizations could be to borrow the law from business
organizations. It is common for the law of nonprofit organizations to
look to its for-profit counterpart as a model, and the statutory
standards for loyalty and care in nonprofit corporations mirror the
standards for business corporations.51 Businesses and nonprofits share
the same kinds of agency cost problems—managers of both might be
tempted to steal from the organization or to shirk their responsibilities.
Good governance in both contexts depends on keeping greed and sloth
at bay.
But there is not much to borrow. Fiduciary duties in business
organizations are hardly enforced by regulators at all. Since corporate
shareholders can bring derivative suits against directors, courts have
had an opportunity to consider more claims for breach of care against
directors of businesses than against nonprofits. Nevertheless, in the
business corporation context—like for nonprofits—the duty of care is
almost never enforced by a court.52 Some corporate law scholars seem
to be satisfied with the lack of legal enforcement of care.53 Edward
Rock and Michael Wachter describe the corporation as “selfgoverning” and argue that if courts intervened regularly in questions of
negligence, centralized management could not function.54 Centralized
management is necessary in nonprofit organizations as well as in
business corporations because decisions must be made and
Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp.
1003, 1021 (D.D.C. 1974).
51. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2007); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (2008).
52. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining the business judgment
rule and rare liability for corporate directors); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)
(discussing care but not imposing any liability for its breach); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig.,
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). The most famous case imposing liability for lack of care,
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), led to an upheaval in the legal community
before the adoption of the liability shield in DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014). See
generally Roundtable Discussion: Corporate Governance, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 235 (2001).
53. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1699 (2001).
54. Id.
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implemented, so we might conclude, by analogy, that we should leave
nonprofits alone to self-govern also.
Keeping courts out of questions of negligence in nonprofit
governance would reduce the role of the state. But given the press’s
and the public’s interest in nonprofit governance (and scandals), media
oversight of nonprofit governance would continue regardless of the
state’s choice.55 The “self-governing” nonprofit organization would be
subject to internal controls and media scrutiny. Abstention by the state
would increase the importance of the media’s role and its method of
shaming charities leaders into good behavior. Would that be preferable
to a larger state role? David Skeel argues, in the business context, that
shaming of corporate directors is a particularly good approach to
enforcing care violations because monetary liability is inappropriate
where the directors did not personally benefit from their fiduciary
failures.56 The problem with ill-fitting judicial remedies is common to
breaches of care in both the for-profit and nonprofit context, so
shaming might be a better remedy for both. Skeel notes that there has
been judicial shaming in the business context by the Delaware courts.57
In addition to front-page newspaper embarrassment, official shaming
is an option in the nonprofit sector as well; the AG could publish lists
of negligent directors and their organizations.58 But an official
shaming remedy would require the same kind of enforcement costs as
other official remedies—the state would need to undertake investigations and prosecutions in getting to that result. The beauty of a
shaming regime is that the press can do it without the participation of
the state so the AG can direct its attention to other issues.59
Another alternative to active enforcement modeled on business
law is increased disclosure. The most significant recent developments
in nonprofit law have related to disclosure.60 Disclosure may make
55. See discussion infra Part III (discussing media shaming in more detail).
56. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811,
1854 (2001) (discussing the Caremark case).
57. Id. at 1855 n.178 (noting that courts have lectured corporate directors in their
opinions).
58. Charities bureaus already do engage in a shaming activity by publishing statistics
about fund-raisers’ share of money raised on behalf of charities. See, e.g., “Pennies for
Charity”—The Attorney General’s Report on Fundraisers in New York, CHARITIESNYS.COM,
http://www.charitiesnys.com/pennies_report_new.jsp (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). For better or
for worse, the media is a more effective purveyor of shame because it gets more readers.
59. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
60. See Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public
Disclosure as a Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183 (2012); Dana Brakman Reiser, There

Ought To Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit
Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559 (2005).
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organizations more internally self-regulating by relying on both
reputational incentives and fear of enforcement. If an organization
must disclose what it is doing, it is more likely to try to do everything
right. It is also more likely that the authorities will discover
wrongdoing, making it easier for them to enforce appropriate fiduciary
duties. Disclosure has long been a feature of the federal law applicable
to public corporations,61 although the nature and breadth of disclosure
requirements differ substantially for businesses and charities.62 IRS
Form 990, the informational return that tax-exempt organizations must
file with the federal government, was recently revised to increase the
governance disclosure it requires.63 The form asks organizations to
explicitly state, for example, whether they have a written conflict-ofinterest policy, whistle-blower policy, and document-retention policy.64
Although the form states that these are policies not required by the tax
law,65 anyone completing the form gets the clear message that the
correct answer to these questions is “yes.” These filings are provided
to the government, but it may be more significant that they are readily
available online,66 so that the public reputation of an organization is at
stake in these answers. Some commentators have been skeptical about
the value of increased disclosure requirements as a self-enforcement
mechanism for the nonprofit sector, particularly given the costs to the
sector of disclosure itself.67 The link between disclosure and
governance improvement may simply be too weak for increased public

61. Reiser, supra note 60, at 570 n.52. Companies with more than $10 million in
assets whose securities are held by more than 500 owners must file reports. Reports are
publicly available. See EDGAR, SEC, http://sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm# (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015).
62. There are many more 990s filed than 10-K reports, and while the precise content
of the disclosed information differs, both forms require financial information and governance
information. See Form 10-K, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015); Form 990, IRS 6 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf.
Though small charities do not have to file lengthy reports, small and private businesses are
not subject to the federal requirements. See Instructions for Form 990-EZ, IRS 1 (Dec. 23,
2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990ez.pdf; Form 10-K, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/form10k.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
63. See 2011 Form 990 and 990-EZ—Significant Changes, IRS (May 18, 2012),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2011_form_990_significant_changes.pdf.
64. Form 990, supra note 62, at 6.
65. Id.
66. GUIDESTAR, http://www.guidestar.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
67. See Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About
Regulation of Nonprofit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 765 (2007); Brody, supra note 60;
Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive
Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205 (2004); Reiser, supra note 60.
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disclosure to be worth its cost, and it is impossible to know how much
“self-governance” that disclosure actually produces.
Disclosure may be a more desirable solution in the business
context than in the nonprofit context. The key factor that makes
disclosure powerful in business law—and allows courts to reasonably
stay out of negligence questions—is markets. Courts do not need to
enforce the duty of care, not because business corporations are actually
“self-governing,” but because the market for corporate control
monitors corporate governance.68 Business directors and executives
ignore the fiduciary standards of conduct at their peril. But nonprofit
directors need not fear a market monitor. In the charities context, there
is no parallel market that functions as a market for control because
nonprofits do not have shareholders who can sell control.69 There are
no proxy contests or even director elections. Nonprofit boards are
self-perpetuating:
current directors recruit their cohorts and
successors.70
The market in which nonprofits operate is a market for charitable
donations, government contracts, and volunteer services. It is possible
that these markets impose some governance constraints; an
organization that does no good is likely to eventually wither from lack
of support. But these markets are not efficient, so they are unlikely to
be nearly as powerful as the market for control in the business context.
Henry Hansmann’s explanation for why nonprofits exist—“contract
failure”—would suggest that donors, beneficiaries, and volunteers
would be slow to recognize a nonprofit’s failure to carry out its
mission.71 Lack of information is a crucial component of “contract
failure,” which Hansmann defines as “the inability to police producers
by ordinary contractual devices.”72 For example, donors who finance
charitable services for others cannot be sure that the services are
actually being provided because they cannot see the services
themselves.
Hansmann explains that the nonprofit form of
68. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 113 (1965). This is the classic story anyway, which has been refined, critiqued,
and tested in the corporate law literature, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
69. But see Dana Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Takeovers: Regulating the Market for
Mission Control, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1181 (analyzing changes in control and direction of
nonprofit organizations and comparing them to corporate takeovers).
70. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 36, at 127 (stating that organizations
without members have no constituents that behave like shareholders, so their governing
boards choose their successors).
71. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
845 (1980).
72. Id.
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organization exists to overcome this problem.73 The nondistribution
constraint that characterizes nonprofits substitutes for a working
market: donors may not be able to confirm that an organization’s
managers used their money the way the organization promised, but at
least they know that managers did not put it in their pockets. None of
these nonprofit constituencies have as powerful a force at their
disposal as that of the corporate takeover market.74 Donors can
withhold their funds, volunteers can withhold their services, and
governments can withhold their contracts, but with self-perpetuating
boards, their effect on governance is limited. So the business
corporation model of self-enforcement seems ill-suited to nonprofits.
The duty of care may be enforced by an invisible hand for public
companies, but it is nonetheless enforced. To the contrary, fiduciary
duties of nonprofit organizations either need to be enforced by the
state or left to the media’s enforcement. The next Part considers the
latter option.
III. MEDIA OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES GOVERNANCE

A. Media Enforcement Is Robust Because Reputation Matters to
Nonprofit Leaders
Stories of charities abuses have long been popular with
newspapers,75 and the growth of the internet has allowed more charities
watchdogs to arise.76 Thus, despite its lack of legal status, the media
has become a crucial player in the story of charities regulation.
Underenforcement of fiduciary duties by AGs and courts does not
mean that nonprofit fiduciaries escape condemnation for their
wrongdoing. Instead, individuals who control charities are more likely
to be censured in the court of public opinion than in a court of law.
Individuals who benefit personally at the expense of the
organizations they serve are prime targets for the press because their
stories can be quite sensational. A front-page story in the New York
Times about Cecilia Chang, a dean at St. John’s University who killed
herself while being tried for stealing more than a million dollars from
See id. at 859-61.
Cf. David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives,
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221 (2009) (arguing for
73.
74.

greater monitoring of nonprofits by donors).
75. The United Way story was uncovered by the Washington Post. See Harvey J.
Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes,
Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 633 (1998).
76. See sources cited supra note 9.
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the university and its donors, was both bizarre and violent.77 While the
legal authorities were criminally prosecuting Chang, news stories were
able to drag in other individuals who may not have been criminally
culpable. For example, the Times reported that the university’s
president, the Reverend Donald Harrington, accepted a Patek Philippe
watch and custom suits from Chang’s supporters.78 Although a less
lurid part of the story, the allegations are troubling from the perspective
of Harrington’s fiduciary duties. Regardless of whether the state ever
proceeds against him, the news reports were certainly embarrassing
and damaging to his reputation.79 By looking at the university’s
leadership, the Times’s story played a crucial role in investigating and
punishing governance lapses by those in charge.
Media shaming also embarrasses organizations, in addition to
individuals associated with them, tarnishing their charitable halos.
Lance Armstrong’s disgraceful fall from hero-athlete to doper cast a
dark shadow over his immensely popular cancer charity, Livestrong. A
front-page newspaper story, published after Armstrong admitted
doping, accused the organization’s leadership of breaches of loyalty:
“While Mr. Armstrong’s celebrity fed the charity, the charity also
enhanced his marketability. Livestrong also engaged in some deals
that appeared to have benefited him and his associates, according to
interviews and financial records.”80 The report alleged that Armstrong
used the charity as part of his defense to the doping accusations.81
These claims suggest troubling governance breaches at the charity
because they imply that the individuals used the charity for personal
ends and that those in control failed to prevent Armstrong from
tainting its charitable mission. Whether or not breaches actually
occurred, a major newspaper’s allegations are sufficient to inflict
substantial damage on a charity’s standing in the community and its
leaders’ reputations.82
77. See William K. Rashbaum, Wendy Ruderman & Mosi Secret, Fallen Dean’s Life,
Contradictory to Its Grisly End, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
12/11/nyregion/a-quick-descent-for-cecilia-chang-dean-at-st-johns.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Stephanie Saul, Armstrong’s Business Brand, Bound Tight with His Charity, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/sports/cycling/lance-armstrongsbusiness-brand-and-livestrong-are-bound-together.html?pagewanted=all.
81. See id.
82. The story also mentions that the charity “hired top lawyers with nonprofit
expertise to make sure its deals were in its best interests and complied with I.R.S. rules.” See

id.
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Lapses in the duty of care, which requires attention and
deliberative process in decision making,83 might seem less sensational
than stealing and other loyalty breaches, but they can also appeal to a
curious public, which will quickly censure. The story of Brandeis
University’s botched attempt to close its Rose Art Museum and sell the
art to ameliorate its dire financial troubles was featured prominently in
the press,84 even though the problem was mismanagement rather than
theft.85 Facing undeniable financial troubles, the Brandeis University
Board of Trustees voted to close its campus art museum and sell the
collection without discussing the issue with the museum’s leadership,
its supporters, or Brandeis’s own fine arts faculty and students.86 The
Boston Globe immediately picked up the story,87 and the New York
Times followed soon thereafter with both a news story88 and a scathing
editorial criticizing the decision.89 Ultimately, the university backed
down and reversed course, but not before the Massachusetts AG
commenced an investigation and museum supporters commenced a
lawsuit.90 Brandeis’s President Jehuda Reinharz resigned two days
after an internal report on the Rose crisis was issued, though he

83.
84.

See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 22, at 201-05.
See Randy Kennedy & Carol Vogel, Outcry over a Plan To Sell Museum’s

Holdings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/arts/design/28
rose.html; Lisa Kocian, Students Rally for Brandeis Museum: Loss Will Hurt School Stature,
Protestors Say, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 30, 2009), available at https://a.next.westlaw.com (search
for “2009 WLNR 1775207”).
85. See Linda Sugin, Lifting the Museum’s Burden from the Backs of the University:
Should the Art Collection Be Treated as Part of the Endowment?, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 541,
566-68 (2010) (arguing that the Rose problem was gross negligence—a problem of lack of
due care because of the manner in which the university reached the decision and not because
the substance of the decision was beyond the powers of the university); see also Paul Dillon,
The Rose Art Museum Crisis, NEW DIRECTION FOR HIGHER EDUC., Fall 2010, at 83 (arguing
that the incident illustrated the complexities in university decision making and control and
was exacerbated by Brandeis’s organizational culture).
86. See Geoff Edgers, Ailing Brandeis Will Shut Museum, Sell Treasured Art: No
Other Choice, Says President, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://a.next.westlaw.
com (search for “2009 WLNR 1536251”).
87. See Geoff Edgers & Peter Schworm, Brandeis To Sell School’s Art Collection,
BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.boston.com/ae/theater_arts/articles/2009/01/26/
brandeis_to_sell_schools_art_collection/.
88. See Brandeis Says It Plans To Sell Art Collection To Raise Cash, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/us/27museum.html; Kennedy & Vogel, supra
note 84.
89. “Selling the university’s art collection would help plug its financial gap, but it
would create a gaping hole in Brandeis’s mission and its reputation.” Editorial, Art at
Brandeis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/opinion/02mon4.
html. The editorial implied a breach of the duty of obedience. See id.
90. See Sugin, supra note 85, at 543.
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claimed the decision was not motivated by the Rose fiasco.91 An
honest and well-meaning director might have gone along with the
decision on the Rose, in the face of other equally unpleasant solutions.
When AGs get involved, they are often followers to the media, as
was the case in the Brandeis fiasco. An investigation of improprieties
at the Getty Trust by the California AG’s office followed an exposé in
the Los Angeles Times and led to state oversight of the trust for a
period of years.92 The Boston Globe first revealed financial abuses at
the Cabot Trust,93 and then the Massachusetts authorities followed up
and provided for restitution to the charity.94 State authorities cannot be
blamed for following the press—it is undoubtedly an efficient strategy
for regulators because they waste little time identifying the problems.95
But it is nonetheless troubling that the media leads in this way because
its leadership in overseeing nonprofit organizations reduces the role of
law and weakens the charitable sector. There is less need for official
action when the remedies the law might provide have already been
meted out or have been rendered moot: a damning story can destroy
an organization by drying up donations.
The immense power of reputation explains how the media has so
successfully displaced legal authorities in charities enforcement. The
benefits of charity participation are often reputational—your name on
a building, status in the community, and/or honors and awards from
local institutions. These accoutrements of charity leadership are all
tied to status in the community, and reputational incentives have long
Dillon, supra note 85, at 88.
See Bill Lockyer, Report on the Office of the Attorney General’s Investigation of
the J. Paul Getty Trust, CAL. ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_
91.
92.

releases/06-085_0a.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (“The Office of the Attorney General’s
Charitable Trusts Section in July 2005 initiated a civil investigation of the Trust. The probe
was launched following a series of articles in the Los Angeles Times . . . .” (footnote
omitted)). There was no finding of criminal wrongdoing in the Getty Trust investigation, so
the investigation solely concerned governance lapses. See id. at 1 n.1.
93. Some Officers of Charities Steer Assets to Selves, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 9, 2003),
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2003/10/09/some_officers_of_charities_steer_as
sets_to_selves/?page=full. Most notoriously, Paul Cabot, the trustee, increased his salary
from the trust to $1.4 million in one year to cover the cost of his daughter’s wedding. Id.
94. See Sacha Pfeiffer & Michael Rezendes, Mass., 2 Other States To Probe
Foundations, BOS. GLOBE (Oct 10, 2003), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/
articles/2003/10/10/mass_2_other_states_to_probe_foundations/?page=full; Walter V. Robinson
& Michael Rezendes, Foundation Chief Agrees To Repay over $4M, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 16,
2004), https://a.next.westlaw.com (search for “2004 WLNR 14185894”).
95. States also depend on whistle-blowers and individuals with knowledge of
improprieties and access to information. See, e.g., Charitable Organization Complaint Form,
MASS.GOV,
https://www.eform.ago.state.ma.us/ago_eforms/forms/char_ecomplaint.action
(last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
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functioned as self-monitoring devices for charity leaders. These
reputational incentives for good performance are consistent with a
commitment to the mission. Almost all trustees volunteer their time
and expertise,96 suggesting that charities directors generally accept their
roles out of nonpecuniary dedication to their organizations. Studies
show that nonprofit employees accept less compensation, support, and
infrastructure at their jobs than their for-profit counterparts, signaling
their mission commitment.97 Reputational incentives for charity
leaders are aligned with mission commitment because the reputation
of an organization and its leaders converge. While reputation is a selfenforcing mechanism that encourages many individuals to act with
self-sacrifice for the common good, it is also a tool that the media
powerfully and purposely wields.

B.

The Good and Bad of Media Enforcement

The most compelling arguments in favor of media
enforcement—and the shaming sanctions that accompany it—are that
it is effective and cheap. Media participation in nonprofit oversight
allows state AGs to devote their scarce resources elsewhere, which
might produce greater overall benefits for both the sector and society.
Given the community of upstanding people who generally serve as
charities fiduciaries, media shaming should be perceived as a serious
punishment. Even if the wrongdoer is shameless, so that the
reputational penalty is ineffective as to him, the collateral effects on
other charity leaders could justify the approach. Most charitable
fiduciaries are respected members of the community and care to
remain that way, so shaming may be well-targeted to be effective with
the intended group. Media enforcement can raise standards of
governance throughout the sector by spreading fear of humiliation and
thereby deterring bad behavior.
According to Marion Fremont-Smith and Andras Kosaras’s
compendium of newspaper reports, most cases described in newspaper
stories on charity wrongdoing also involve a government enforcement
96. See KURTZ, supra note 21, at 6. Directors do not work full time for an
organization. Nonprofit executives who do work full time receive compensation, which is
one of the most controversial issues in nonprofit governance today. See S. 7565, 2012 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012) (prohibiting salaries for directors of public charities and
instituting standards for reasonableness of executive compensation).
97. See Peter Frumkin & Elizabeth K. Keating, The Price of Doing Good: Executive
Compensation in Nonprofit Organizations 8 (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper
No. 8, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol/papers.cfm?abstract_id=292253 (citing
studies).
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party at some point.98 However, there are some cases in which no
government agencies were involved and the “case” was overseen
entirely by the press, sometimes with impressive results. The Dallas
Morning News reported that the Kimbell Art Foundation overpaid its
president and vice president.99 Even though there was no government
action to recover excess benefits, the individuals agreed to forego
future compensation—an impressive remedy.100 The San Diego Union
Tribune reported that the executive director of the San Diego Museum
of Art was alleged to have received excessive compensation, and
financial controls were implemented at the organization without
governmental intervention.101 In other cases, the charity took the
matter into its own hands after press reports, which is also a desirable
outcome from a good-governance perspective. For example, in the
case of the Giving Back Fund, the charity sued the self-dealing director
and settled the case, and in the case of the Communities Foundation of
Texas, the charity investigated itself and implemented internal
controls.102 On the other hand, there are press stories followed by no
remedial action, such as in the case of the National Foundation for
AIDS Relief, which also involved allegations of excessive
compensation reported in the press.103 Thus, not all media enforcement
produces governance improvement.
The press has a long history of monitoring abuses in the
nonprofit sector, so it is experienced in this role, which is another
argument in its favor. Perhaps the most famous nonprofit abuse—the
United Way scandal involving William Aramony—was exposed by the
Washington Post in 1992.104 And we might believe that media
enforcement is more effective today than it was twenty years ago
98. Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and
Directors of Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25
(2003), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic (select “Advanced
Options”; type “Tax Analysts Exempt Organization Tax Review Magazine” into the “Source”
section; then search for “wrongdoing by officers and directors of charities”; select the first
result).
99. Id. at 54 & n.29.
100. Id. at 54.
101. Id. at 56 & n.46.
102. Id. at 52.
103. Id. at 55.
104. Charles E. Shepard, Perks, Privileges and Power in a Nonprofit World; Head of
United Way America Praised, Criticized for Running It Like a Fortune 500 Company, WASH.
POST, Feb. 16, 1992, available at http://library.tulane.edu/ (search for “perks, privileges and
power in a nonprofit world”; select “Articles”; follow first “check TULink” hyperlink; follow
“full text online” hyperlink for Factiva database). Reports of William Aramony’s behavior
had been uncovered in “several publications.” Teltsch, supra note 10.
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because it is more sustained and focused. There are a number of
reputable organizations that hold themselves out as charity watchdogs,
reporting on the activities and decisions of organizations.105
In spite of these reasons to be enthusiastic about media
enforcement, there are more reasons to be skeptical. “The majority of
publishers, editors and reporters contend that the primary role of
journalism is to expose wrongdoing.”106 This is a problem from the
perspective of media enforcement of legal obligations for a few
reasons. The press may be too zealous in looking for abuses where
none exist or in identifying something ambiguous as wrongdoing. The
press may prove itself too enthusiastic an enforcer, able to indict
without following through on evidence to convict and to bury
vindication where few readers tread.107 While the state, because it is
subject to the rule of law, may not be arbitrary and capricious in its
legal decisions, the press is not bound by the same standard. There is
no required fair process for media accusations or a requirement for
proportionality. If the press’s role is to expose wrongdoing, then
scandals get reported while successes do not. Even where the press
gets the facts right—which it often does—this imbalance is
problematic for the charitable sector because it creates the impression
of more wrongdoing as a percentage of the whole than is accurate.
The sector as a whole suffers when the bad is the only story and the
good is ignored.
The media attention to a particular scandal might not reflect the
seriousness of any legal violations but might instead reflect the public
interest in a celebrity108 or a well-known institution. A small scandal
involving a well-known individual is likely to get more press attention
than a larger one that is less sensational. Under the law of some states,
105. See sources cited supra note 9.
106. David Bornstein, Why ‘Solutions Journalism’ Matters, Too, N.Y. TIMES
OPINIONATOR (Dec. 20, 2011, 8:48 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/
20/why-solutions-journalism-matters-too/ (citing DAVID L. PROTESS ET AL., THE JOURNALISM
OF OUTRAGE: INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND AGENDA BUILDING IN AMERICA 14 (1991)).
107. By the time a determination of no wrongdoing is concluded, the public
humiliation has already occurred. If you blinked, or failed to get to page thirteen, you would
have missed the clearing of General John Allen in the Tampa socialite scandal. See Thom
Shanker, Pentagon Clears Commander over E-Mails, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/us/pentagon-clears-general-allen-over-e-mails-withsocialite.html.
108. See Deborah Sontag & Stephanie Strom, Star’s Candidacy in Haiti Puts Focus on
Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/world/americas/
17haiti.html (detailing allegations and problems with hip-hop star Wyclef Jean’s
postearthquake Haiti charity).
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the legal punishment allowed for care violations can be limited,109 but
the press may shame regardless of the statute. The press is in a
position to embarrass everyone, whether they did something evil,
clueless, or harmless. Its enforcement is insensitive to fine legal
distinctions, meting out a uniform punishment of public
embarrassment. Even more than legal authorities, who may have
trouble with remedies,110 media enforcement cannot tailor remedies to
suit particular problems.
The current crisis in the newspaper business might mean less
careful enforcement than should be acceptable as a substitute for legal
action. Newspapers are traditionally concerned about their own
reputations, so readers are confident in the reliability of their reporting.
But the newspaper industry has suffered a severe blow in the last
decade.111 In their struggle to survive, some newspapers have
sacrificed in ways that reduce confidence in both their integrity and
their ability to report accurately. Hundreds of journalists have been
fired. While we cannot blame newspapers for responding to their own
industry’s pressures, we need to recognize that the changes might make
them less reliable monitors of fiduciary behavior. It may be unfair to
expect that newspapers can afford to carry the burden of law
enforcement.
The ubiquity and permanence of information on the Internet also
raises concern about the media’s reliability for nonprofit enforcement.
Not only are there more watchdogs than there were a decade or two
ago, but their accusations are increasingly easy to find and more
accessible to more individuals. It is cheaper to be a media watchdog
today than it once was, which has led to a proliferation of oversight,
both reliable and questionable. Along with the many reputable
websites run by organizations committed to defined standards, there
are also individuals who have self-selected as monitors of charity

109. Organizations can include a provision in their certificate of incorporation limiting
remedies for breach of care to nonfinancial penalties. DEL CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014)
(allowing the inclusion in a certificate of incorporation of a “provision eliminating or limiting
the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages
for breach of fiduciary duty as a director”); see also MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31
(2008) (describing liability standards for directors).
110. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
111. See JACK FULLER, WHAT IS HAPPENING TO NEWS: THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION
AND THE CRISIS IN JOURNALISM (2010); Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Can Nonprofits Save
Journalism?: Legal Constraints and Opportunities, JOAN SHORENSTEIN CENTER ON PRESS,
POL., PUB. POL’Y (Oct. 2009), http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/can_
nonprofits_save_journalism_fremont-smith.pdf.
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behavior.112 A Google search will reveal their accusations as readily as
those of more careful institutions. More troubling is the fact that any
accusation of misbehavior, whether ultimately proved true or not, is
permanently in the searchable history of an individual or group. The
Internet broadens the range of embarrassment to a wider, more
geographically dispersed audience. Every future employer, client, and
blind date will know that an individual was involved in something
embarrassing related to a charity. Reputational taints are more
permanent today than they were when the daily newspaper was
discarded at the end of the day, so we should be more careful about
imposing reputational costs on people.
The public may have unrealistically high expectations for charity
officials. There is interest in the indiscretions of charities leaders
because there is a widely held expectation that those who serve
charities are better than the rest of us. “Although we have come to
expect a certain amount of lying, cheating, and stealing in the private
and public sectors, in the court of public opinion, the nonprofit sector,
and especially charities, are held to a higher standard.”113 The halo
effect of charities extends to all who are associated with them, and
evidence that individuals are lowly humans is sometimes treated as
scandalous. In William Aramony’s obituary, readers were reminded
about his extramarital affair with a girl just out of high school.114 There
was nothing criminal about the affair in itself—she was not a child—
and yet, it seemed that his position as a major charity leader was
inconsistent with his sex life.115 He siphoned money from the United
Way for her, but more broadly for himself, which was the illegal part;
but reading the obituary, you might think the legal problem involved
sex rather than money.116 Even donors to charities are more scrutinized
than others who engage in the same type of behavior. Consider
Alberto Vilar, who was convicted of defrauding a client out of $5
112. Are you familiar with DON’T TELL THE DONOR.ORG, http://donttellthedonor.blog
spot.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); NONPROFITEER, http://nonprofiteer.net (last visited Mar.
1, 2015); or NONPROFIT BOARD CRISIS, http://www.nonprofitboardcrisis.typepad.com (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015)? It is hard to know whom to trust.
113. BARBARA KELLERMAN, BAD LEADERSHIP: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT HAPPENS, WHY IT
MATTERS 165 (2004).
114. See Robert D. McFadden, William Aramony, United Way Leader Who Was Jailed
for Fraud, Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/
business/william-aramony-disgraced-leader-of-united-way-dies-at-84.html; William Aramony
Dead at 84, THE NONPROFIT TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/newsarticles/william-aramony-dead-at-84/.
115. See William Aramony Dead at 84, supra note 114.
116. See id.
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million and sentenced to nine years in jail.117 His crimes have received
much more attention than similar crimes of others because he was a
well-known philanthropist and his misappropriations might have been
connected to gifts he made to the Metropolitan Opera.118
Public approbation can arise if there is a suggestion of
impropriety, even where it is not clear that any legal wrongdoing
actually occurred. Some people believe that charity executives should
accept less compensation than they would have received for similar
work in the private sector. The press is perennially interested in
nonprofit-executive compensation, even when there is no claim of
impropriety connected to it,119 and charity executives are unable to keep
their salaries private because IRS Form 990 requires disclosure.120 The
New York State Board of Regents’ overhaul of Adelphi University’s
board was partly about its president’s compensation of $837,113
(including retirement benefits and in-kind perks) in 1995-96.121 That
was very high at the time for a college president, but was it so high as
to be an obvious waste of university resources? The same year, Florida
State University paid its football coach more than $1 million.122 Many
of the well-known governance scandals involve compensation and
perks,123 even though the determination of reasonable compensation
under the law is difficult and inexact.124 Under federal law, the section

117. There was a lengthy profile of him in The New Yorker. See James B. Stewart,
The Opera Lover; Onward and Upward with the Arts, NEW YORKER (Feb. 13, 2006),
http://newyorker.com/magazine/2006/02/13/the-opera-lover.
118. See Stewart, supra note 117.
119. The New York Times reports on college presidents annually. See, e.g., Tamar
Lewin, Three Dozen Private-College Presidents Earned over $1 Million in 2010, Study Finds,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/education/three-dozenprivate-college-presidents-earned-over-1-million-in-2010.html; Tamar Lewin, Private-College
Presidents Getting Higher Salaries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/12/05/education/increase-in-pay-for-presidents-at-private-colleges.html.
120. See Form 990, supra note 62, at 7-8 (requiring information about the compensation of officers, directors, trustees, key employees, and the five highest compensated
employees). This is much more disclosure than is required of business organizations. See
Form 10-K, supra note 62.
121. See Meyer, supra note 20.
122. Bobby Bowden was the first college coach to break the $1 million mark, but now
that is common. See Michael Sanserino, College Coaches’ Salaries Continue To Soar,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 15, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/
nation/2011/01/15/College-coaches-salaries-continue-to-soar/stories/201101150179.
123. For example, Barry Munitz, of the Getty Trust, enjoyed excessive perks but did
not siphon funds from the charity. See Lockyer, supra note 92, at 2-3.
124. For a good discussion of reasonable compensation and I.R.C. § 4958 (2012), see
Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 735 (2007).
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4958 regulations125 take an arm’s-length comparative approach to
compensation, expressly allowing comparison with for-profit
compensation for similar jobs,126 even though that might appear
excessive to people who are committed to lower relative salaries in the
nonprofit sector.127 The standard for excessive compensation in the
federal tax regulations does not always coincide with the expectations
that people have about what is a fair pay package for nonprofit
executives, and compensation has increased even after the adoption of
the federal rules.128 Public outrage over salaries is not always rational
or justified.
The media operates with little check on its judgment because
there are no “norm entrepreneurs”129 in nonprofit governance who use
the media but are more reliable watchdogs than the journalists
themselves. I am thinking of the model of Robert Monks and Nell
Minow, who have been effective in fostering improved corporate
governance by publicizing inadequate behavior in the media. Monks
and Minow are in the business of advising shareholders for
institutional investors. On one occasion, they placed a full page ad in
the Wall Street Journal accusing the directors of the Sears Corporation
of being “non-performing assets,” and within a short time, the
directors changed their behavior.130 Monks and Minow are effective
nongovernmental watchdogs due to a combination of factors that are
mostly inapposite in the nonprofit context. First, their clients (and
consequently their business) stand to gain or lose on account of their
125. I.R.C. § 4958 imposes an excise tax on excess benefit transactions, which include
excessive compensation of individuals in positions of control in the organization.
126. The rebuttable presumption of reasonableness in Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)
(2012) requires that the organization use appropriate comparability data for compensation.
The regulation states, “In the case of compensation, relevant information includes, but is not
limited to, compensation levels paid by similarly situated organizations, both taxable and taxexempt, for functionally comparable positions . . . .” Id.
127. A proposed New York law takes a narrower approach:
Compensation exchanged by a not-for-profit corporation for the performance of services by
an executive must not be excessive and the governing body (i.e., the board of directors, board
of trustees, or equivalent controlling body) shall consider factors including, but not limited to:
compensation levels paid by similarly situated not-for-profit corporations as defined in
section one hundred two of this chapter; the availability of similar services in the geographic
area of the applicable provider of services; current compensation surveys compiled by
independent firms; and actual written offers from similar institutions competing for the
services of the applicable executive.
S. 7565, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012) (proposing to add section 727 to the
New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, although this was not adopted).
128. See Manny, supra note 124, at 735-37.
129. See Skeel, supra note 56, at 1859.
130. See id. at 1826, 1846, 1848.
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actions, so they have capital and goodwill at stake when they accuse
boards of bad performance. Their successes in corporate governance
reforms translate into profits for their clients and for themselves.
Second, their actions come at significant cost to themselves—their
Sears board ad cost over $100,000.131 Third, they have credibility on
account of their experience and their personal investment in the cause;
Monks was once a bank president, and he has used his personal
Without established norm
resources to fund his ventures.132
entrepreneurs with stakes in the outcome of nonprofit governance, the
arbiters of reputation for nonprofit actors are the media itself, who lack
the incentives and constraints that norm entrepreneurs face.
Media oversight might not be as effective in deterring bad
behavior as one might hope, and too much media attention to
nonprofit abuses may backfire and reduce overall social welfare. In
the criminal context, scholars have argued that too much shaming can
reduce public interest in the bad behavior and consequently fail to
produce the intended deterrence; the public may become accustomed
to the negative publicity and stop noticing it.133 That would be a
problem in the charitable context as well, undermining the
effectiveness of media oversight without governance improvements.
The opposite effect from media overload is also troubling in the
charitable context: too many stories of charity abuse can undermine
the public’s trust in the charitable sector as a whole and the public’s
commitment to support it.
Sometimes bad leaders bring fundamentally good organizations
down with them, an unfortunate by-product of public shaming of
fiduciaries. Charitable institutions are more vulnerable to the effects
of public ignominy than are for-profit corporations because the loss of
donations can have an immediate, devastating effect on charitable
services; charitable donors are not equivalent to washing machine
purchasers, who may buy a good product even if it is produced by a
company with bad governance.134 Hale House, one of the “most

131. See id. at 1826 n.56.
132. See id. at 1859.
133. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1880, 1930-31 (1991).
134. The stock price may reflect bad press, but the price of the stock in the market may
not have any immediate effect on the underlying operations of the business. Charitable
organizations with large endowments may weather volatility in donations better than others,
but many organizations have no endowment on which to rely.
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famous charities in the world” in 1985,135 never fully recovered from
its 2001 scandal, which involved the theft of millions of dollars by the
organization’s president (and founder’s daughter).136 While it is
impossible to know whether the organization could have recovered
from the abuses if it had sufficient funds, the donating public did not
give it that chance. Hale House continues to exist today, but it is a
shadow of its former self. Business shaming strategies may encourage
better corporate governance,137 but charity shaming strategies are
unlikely to produce net benefits to the charitable sector because the
immediate deleterious effect on donations is likely to be more harmful
than the long-term salutary effects on governance improvements.
There has been a lively debate in the criminal law literature about
shaming as a criminal sanction. While media shaming of nonprofits is
not quite analogous, the criminal law debate may shed some light on
the general desirability of a shaming strategy. Proponents of shaming
argue that it is an effective and efficient alternative to other criminal
penalties, and opponents argue that shaming disrespects individuals
and is not ultimately successful as a deterrent.138 As we consider the
remedy of public embarrassment for negligent charity governance, it is
helpful to note that the weight of opinion in that literature seems to
have turned decidedly against shaming, with Dan Kahan, an early
champion,139 explicitly recanting.140 The reasons are many, but those
who are willing to countenance shaming in the criminal context are
dubious about the conditions under which it would take place in our
society.141 We generally operate in a community that is too big for
effective shaming sanctions, which demand reintegration after
shaming. Misgivings among criminal law scholars should make
135. Kathryn Jean Lopez, Scandal at Hale House: Sifting Through the Rubble of a
Once-Proud Nonprofit, PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE (Aug./Sept. 2001), http://www.
philanthropyroundtable.org/topic/excellence_in_philanthropy/scandal_at_hale_house.
136. See Heidi Evans, Hale House Shuts Doors to Orphans, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 8,
2008, 6:58 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/hale-house-shuts-doors-orphansarticle-1.303533; Lopez, supra note 135. In 2008, Hale House substantially scaled back its
program, still suffering from reduced funds. See Evans, supra.
137. See Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 959 (1999) (arguing that corporate directors should be required to be present at
the criminal sentencing of the corporation).
138. See Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming
Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186 (2003).
139. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591 (1996).
140. See Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 2075 (2006).
141. See Massaro, supra note 133, at 1917-35.
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charities officials wary about embracing reputational sanctions to
foster better nonprofit governance.
In addition, there are important distinctions between criminal law
shaming and enforcing fiduciary duties through public embarrassment
that make the strategy even less attractive in the latter context. First,
the criminal law literature evaluates shaming as opposed to
incarceration,142 while incarceration is not the model in fiduciary duty
enforcement.
In governance, the alternative is some greater
governmental participation along a wide spectrum of enforcement that
might include regulation, disclosure, liability, and/or advisory
procedures like the ones advocated here. Rehabilitation in this context
is about fostering good decision-making practices, and as long as there
are alternatives to shaming that might achieve that goal better than
public humiliation, they should be pursued. Second, the criminal law
literature assumed that shaming would be imposed by a governmental
institution so that a court might require a convicted drunk driver to
publicize that fact in a bumper sticker or the state might publish a list
of the clients of prostitutes.143
Reputational punishments for
inadequate charity governance meted out by the press are wholly
outside the law. For all these reasons, enforcement by humiliation is
bad policy that undermines the rule of law, even if it is effective in
improving charity governance.
If we are dissatisfied with the role of the press and believe that
the corporate model of self-enforcement ill suits nonprofits, greater
government involvement by the state will be necessary. Media
attention is unlikely to wane, and increased media regulation is
unlikely to be desirable or pass muster under the First Amendment.
The government needs to do more to reset the balance. States must
make and develop law, something the media is institutionally unable to
do. They also need to be the neutral arbiter of good charity
governance, applying the law in an evenhanded and accountable way,
without concern for celebrity and sensationalism, a neutrality that the
media cannot guarantee.
Charity officials have lost ground, and that is troubling because
state charity bureaus, unlike the journalists and bloggers, are
concerned with the legal standards and with protecting the charitable
sector and its resources. The primary reason why states should
142. See Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions: Reflections
on the Future of Shaming Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1385 (2007).
143. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A
Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 367 (1999).
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respond to the challenge of private enforcers is because there is no
guarantee that the private enforcers care to, or are in a position to,
maximize public benefit. State AGs cannot be passive observers of
media enforcement; if the state chooses to underenforce fiduciary
obligations, it is choosing to allow private parties to manage that
enforcement instead. The increasing power and influence of media
enforcers need to be countered with greater activity by state AGs. We
must recognize that the problem is not only that bad things are
happening without legal consequences, but that legal institutions are
failing to prevent those things from happening before they do. Given
media attention, the confidentiality paradox, and the scarcity of legal
guidance, states should consider shifting some of their focus to better
facilitating good governance.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
Charity governance needs more focused attention and more
expert decision making by nonprofit fiduciaries. Unfortunately,
current institutions are not designed to promote these objectives. Too
much attention has been focused on ex post enforcement after
wrongdoing has occurred, rather than ex ante intervention to prevent
wrongdoing. The tools used by AGs and courts are not designed to
raise the quality of governance decisions because they are backwardlooking: both state regulators and courts exercise their power to order
financial restitution—an appropriate remedy in cases of loyalty
breaches—but this is rarely a cure for the problems of insufficient care
or obedience.144 Financial restitution is only apt where a fiduciary
breach is clearly connected to a past loss of charitable funds. The
remedy in the Sibley Hospital case—a judicially imposed education
for directors in their governance obligations145—attempted to address
the source of the problem identified by the court. The remedy did not
actually cure the failure to exercise care that had previously taken
place, but it did hone in on the nature of the breach. At the same time,
the remedy was weak as an enforcement sanction. So, even though it
was designed to suit the problem, it seems insufficient in the ex post
context.
There are substantial roadblocks to increasing ex post
enforcement of fiduciary duties. Resources are a primary one. The
144. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
145. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses &
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1021 (D.D.C. 1974).
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perennial problem of scarce state enforcement resources has
understandably beggared charitable governance; many AGs focus their
limited attention on the problems of fraud, leaving governance for the
sector to manage.146 But the best use of scarce public resources needs
to be evaluated more broadly, considering the context of the social
benefits of the charitable sector as a whole. It is a mistake to focus
solely on the budgetary costs to state AG offices in determining
whether it is worthwhile to invest in charity governance. The larger
social costs of poor governance need to be factored in as well.
Solutions should value overall efficiencies so that the costs to charities,
as well as to government, are considered. These charity costs include
the difficulty of attracting good directors, litigation costs incurred
whether governance practices are vindicated or not, and public faith in
the integrity of the sector. States and individual organizations should
both be willing to make investments that can prevent greater public
and charity costs in the future.
Increasing disclosure has been one strategy.147 Although
disclosure might generate greater enforcement opportunities, state
resources have not enabled AGs to mine the disclosures the way they
might. States could capitalize on disclosure by allowing others to
bring enforcement actions; nonprofits could mimic the shareholder
derivative action. Similarly, states could promote judicial enforcement
of trustee fiduciary obligations by expanding the rules for standing to
donors (and others) and thereby allow private parties to assist the state
in enforcement. Though some scholars have advocated broader
standing rules,148 more plaintiffs would mean more harassment and
expense for nonprofit organizations, with questionable governance
benefits to offset those costs.
Another option to increase enforcement would be to pare back
the “best judgment rule,” which protects the exercise of judgment by
trustees who act in good faith and without conflicts of interest.149 But it

146. Judging from their websites, many states focus their attention specifically on
solicitation fraud. About Charities, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/attorneygeneral/2382.htm (last
visited Mar. 7, 2015); Charities, MICH. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7164-17337-18095---,00.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
147. See Brody, supra note 60; Reiser, supra note 60.
148. See, e.g., Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing To Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil
Society vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1101 (2005) (“[D]onors whose
restricted gifts are crucial to the vitality and diversity of the charitable sector should have
standing to enforce those gifts . . . .”).
149. The “best judgment rule” is the nonprofit corporation corollary of the business
judgment rule for business corporations. It empowers directors to make bad decisions
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would be unwise to abrogate the best judgment rule because it strikes
an important balance in the law. The rule is essential in the nonprofit
sector to enable organizations to attract directors and, more
importantly, to maintain the private character of charity governance.150
Judicial micromanagement of charity governance is unlikely to
produce net benefits for the charitable sector, and any judicial solution
could require changing core elements of nonprofit law. A less
dramatic solution to governance lapses would be preferable.
Creative, forward-looking action better fits the problems
connected with care and obedience (and even sometimes loyalty) than
any kind of after-the-fact enforcement.
Even though it is
underdeveloped in legal precedent and underenforced by state
authorities, lawyers advising charities believe that the duty of care is
authentic and that the minimum standard of charity oversight requires
fiduciaries to pay attention and gather information.151 Charities need to
hew to their mission, even though there is little particular guidance that
teaches them how.152
We need to focus on the goals of greater enforcement for
fiduciary duties. Care technically requires process,153 but that process
is always a proxy for improved substance. Care demands deliberation
and information gathering in the hope that the substantive decisions
that boards reach are better.154 But process is not always a good
substitute for a correct answer on the merits, and some studies indicate
that imposing some forms of “good” process do not necessarily
improve substantive outcomes.155
For these reasons, I propose a formal advance-ruling procedure
under which state AGs provide advice to nonprofit fiduciaries on
without being second-guessed by courts. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 36, at 15253.
150. See generally Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, How Public Is Private Philanthropy?:
Separating Reality from Myth, PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE (2012), http://www.philanthropy
roundtable.org/file_uploads/How_Public_Is_Private_Philanthropy.pdf.
151. See Goldschmid, supra note 75, at 632 (describing law as “aspirational”).
152. See Sugin, supra note 7, at 925-27.
153. “The members of the board of directors . . . , when becoming informed in
connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight
function, must discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would
reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.” MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT
§ 8.30(b) (2008).
154. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 22, at 201-05.
155. For example, independent boards might not produce better governance. See
Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate
Governance? (Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
1002421, 2007) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1002421.
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specific fiduciary decisions. Such a process would be particularly
valuable for care questions, because—as I have argued—there is no
adequate way to repair care after a breach. An advance-ruling process
could also extend to loyalty156 and obedience questions; the dilemmas
posed in the introduction to this Article raise all three kinds of issues.
Advance rulings could be a more effective and efficient use of state
resources than other approaches to improved enforcement, like
disclosure and broader standing rules. Recall that a central problem
with fiduciary duties of nonprofit directors is that there is so little legal
authority on even the most fundamental issues that nonprofit
fiduciaries regularly find themselves facing.157 There are too many
questions for which there are no definitive answers, and the states
should try to fill that gap by issuing guidance that fiduciaries—and
their lawyers—can use to guide their behavior.
The ruling process could resemble the private letter ruling
process at the IRS.158 A charity would have to follow procedures
determined by the state and have a question that the AG is willing to
rule on. The ruling request would need to set out both the legal
questions presented and the facts to which the law should be applied.159
In the tax context, the question is often: will this transaction be
taxable? In the charities context, the question will often be: will these
actions satisfy the board’s fiduciary obligations? While the AG might
be able to answer with a short yes or no, even a minimal application of
the law to the facts would be helpful to other boards with similar
problems. In selected cases, the AG might choose to write a longer
“opinion” analyzing an important question of law.
Like private letter rulings, these advance rulings would not have
precedential effect or become binding on the state in other cases, but
they would provide guidance to the charity requesting the letter160 and
establish a body of decisions that advisors could use in understanding
the contours of charity fiduciary law. After some time, for example,
156. Loyalty questions often turn into process questions because the statutory safe
harbor provisions that apply to conflict-of-interest transactions consist of cleansing processes.
See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (2014). I am grateful to Caroline Gentile for this
point.
157. See discussion supra Part II.A.
158. See Rev. Proc. 2012-1, 2012-1 I.R.B. 1-91. The provision of advice by regulators
is not unique to the IRS. The Securities and Exchange Commission also provides advice—
even answering questions by telephone. See Manual of Publicly Available Telephone
Interpretations, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone.shtml (last modified Feb. 2,
2007).
159. See Rev. Proc. 2012-1, 2012-1 I.R.B. at 18-30.
160. See id. at 50-53.
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we would get a sense of what constitutes adequate, minimum
participation necessary for a board member to satisfy her duties and
the kinds of deliberations and disclosures that would satisfy the
statutory procedures for review of conflict transactions161 (as well as
the nature of the conflicts transactions that are acceptable). Because
fiduciary duties are broad, general guidance (even if not binding on the
government) is helpful.
As a first step toward building a useful body of law, I would
challenge state AGs to redact and publish the settlements they have
entered into that have been kept secret. There may currently be a large
body of guidance that charities could use if it were made available to
them. State AGs could follow the IRS ruling model of confidentiality
by protecting the identity of an organization but disclosing its issues.
In the versions publicly available under the Freedom of Information
Act (and regularly published), IRS letters provide sufficient facts for
subsequent actors to measure their similarity to the requesting party,
but not so much that applicants are outed in the process.
My proposal for an advance-ruling process takes advantage of
some of the unique characteristics of charities. While there is
admittedly deliberate wrongdoing in the charitable sector, public
policies should capitalize on the general perception that charitable
fiduciaries are devoted to the missions of their organizations and
volunteer to participate as a way to do good in the community. My
proposal builds on their good intentions and honest efforts, while
recognizing that there is a limit to their time, attention, and good
judgment. Will Rogers is claimed to have said, “Good judgment
comes from experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgment.”162
The problem for fiduciaries is that there is no room for the bad
judgment to come first, so good judgment needs to come from
something other than experience. The queasy feeling that a lawyer
may have when presented with a transaction between an organization
and one of its directors may not raise any red flags for a well-meaning
fellow director who is ignorant of the law and busy with other
concerns.
The specter of public embarrassment that nonprofit fiduciaries
face when they err is likely to be sufficient to encourage them to take
extra steps to avoid mistakes—as long as the cost of avoidance is not
too high. The risk of making a bad mistake might be small, the risk of
161. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.60 (2008).
162. Will Rogers Legacy: Remembering That Old Cowboy, CA.GOV, http://www.
parks.ca.gov/?page_id=23998 (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
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being found out is even smaller, and the risk of being legally
sanctioned is virtually nonexistent, but the risk of being embarrassed
in the community could be substantial. Trustees can be expected to
make a cost-benefit analysis of any ex ante mechanisms that can
prevent future missteps.
The New York AG is on the right track with its new Directors U
initiative, which offers instruction in good governance to nonprofit
directors.163 Some states include guidelines for good practices on their
websites, but visits to the AG websites of all fifty states have revealed
how little is available to guide the well-meaning but confused charity
fiduciary.164 Many states are more focused on fundraising and the
important issues of solicitation fraud and donor protection than on
charity governance, per se. Training charitable fiduciaries to
understand their obligations and preparing them to manage problems
they might face could greatly improve the quality of charity
governance.165 However, I am skeptical about how many individuals
will volunteer to undergo training if they are not legally required to do
so under a statute.166 Board meetings and charity functions are already
an imposition on the time of volunteer board members who have jobs,
families, and other obligations. People do not necessarily recognize
that they could use training until they have a problem they cannot
solve, and, even then, they are likely to be more concerned with a
specific solution to that problem than with general standards of
behavior that might not shed light on the particular case.
An advance-ruling process makes financial sense for both states
and charities. An important feature of tax private letter rulings are the
163. See A.G. Schneiderman Announces Bold Plan To Revitalize and Reform New
York’s Nonprofit Sector, N.Y. ATT’Y GEN. (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/ag-schneiderman-announces-bold-plan-revitalize-and-reform-new-yorks-nonprofitsector.
164. Visits to the AG websites of all fifty states revealed that some sites were not
searchable (Alabama, Idaho, and Wyoming) and others had no information on charities (e.g.,
Mississippi, Nebraska, and West Virginia). The vast majority had very little information for
charities and were primarily directed toward donor protection. Only a few states had a
substantial amount of helpful information for charity fiduciaries (California, Massachusetts,
and New York). Research compilation of state AG websites is on file with author.
165. New York is way ahead of the pack in offering both training and attorneymatching services to nonprofits. This is an initiative with the New York City Bar Association.
See City Bar Justice Center’s Public Service Network Places 1,000th Volunteer, N.Y.C. BAR
(Oct. 20, 2010), http://www2.nycbar.org/citybarjusticecenter/news-a-media/press-releases/
122-city-bar-justice-centers-public-service-network-places-1000th-volunteer-lawyer.
166. S. 7565, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012) (proposing the addition of
section 116 to the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law), provides that nonprofit
corporations contracting with the state may attend state consortium training free of charge,
but does not require them to do so.
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fees that requesting parties must pay.167 For strapped charities bureaus,
fees paid by requesting parties can finance all or part of the project.
The IRS charges more for more complex rulings and reduces fees for
small taxpayers; charities bureaus could follow the same pattern and
have sliding fees based on resources and complexity. It would often be
in the best interest of a charity to pay a modest fee and request AG
advice because a ruling would not only foreclose state enforcement
vis-à-vis the requesting charity, but would also protect that
organization from private litigation on the issue, a real advantage for
the organization. The IRS requires that requesting parties draft what is
essentially a legal brief and submit it as part of the ruling request. This
reduces costs for the government in researching the issue and
identifying relevant authority, and the model is attractive in this context
also. Depending on the issue, some types of charity requests might be
prepared without the assistance of a lawyer; the charities bureau could
design a model form for certain types of ruling requests that
moderately competent directors could complete. One example might
be a series of questions related to satisfaction of the safe harbor for
independent review of conflict-of-interest transactions. It could
inquire as to the nature of the conflict disclosed, the nature of the
transaction, and the process undertaken by the organization to
determine the transaction’s fairness.168
Early intervention by the AG can prevent later needs for
enforcement, so the total commitment of resources by the state might
not be so much higher than it is today. Consider the example of the
Rose Art Museum again. The university’s unilateral announcement
was followed quickly by litigation that continued despite intervention
by the state. The Massachusetts AG was involved in the resolution of
the problem but was too late to prevent the incident from becoming a
fiasco for Brandeis and its president. The matter was not finally
closed until the private litigation settled quite a while later.169 Earlier
involvement by the AG that forestalls private actions would benefit
charities like Brandeis by reducing the costs of potential missteps. The
resources that go into disputes with private parties are a precious loss
to the charitable sector, often with no offsetting benefit. Even where
167. See I.R.C. § 7528 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2012-1, 2012-1 I.R.B. 55-61, 68-72; Rev.
Proc. 2012-8, 2012-1 I.R.B. 235.
168. Different states have different statutes for cleansing conflicted transactions, but
these are the common elements. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (2014).
169. Brandeis announced the settlement with the plaintiffs and the termination of the
AG’s investigation on June 30, 2011. See Brandeis, Plaintiffs Settle Rose Art Museum
Lawsuit, BRANDEIS NOW (June 30, 2011), http://www.brandeis.edu/now/2011/june/rose.html.
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challengers are denied standing to challenge the charity’s actions,170
defending the action is a drain of charitable resources. It would be
worth extra investment in the charities bureaus to prevent the massive
expenses incurred in litigation.
This proposal is not designed to foil purposeful wrongdoers. Nor
would it help to solve the problem of completely clueless charity
fiduciaries. Accordingly, an advance-ruling process would not
preempt the need for all state enforcement of fiduciary obligations.
Instead, the process is intended for well-meaning, busy, and somewhat
ignorant directors—which is likely to be the vast majority. They need
to know that they can turn to the AG for guidance, but they do not need
to know much about the substance of their obligations before they do.
This is an important advantage of the proposal because it is often
easier to recognize that you have a problem than it is to determine the
solution. Requesting a ruling on a unique question seems more
realistic than expecting charity fiduciaries to suddenly embrace their
legal responsibilities with sustained attention and enthusiasm.
In the aggregate, an advance-ruling process has the potential to
improve nonprofit governance throughout the sector by creating more
law. Because the AG will be guiding the contours, the proposal allows
the states to reclaim control over fiduciary duty law. While there will
likely be a high demand for rulings at first, as more guidance becomes
available, the need for further rulings should decline, reducing the cost
to both charities and government. The goal of the system is to create a
body of law robust and varied enough that individual charities will not,
in fact, need to request their own rulings unless they have unique
issues.
V.

CONCLUSION

We are in an unfortunate bind in the world of charity law. If an
organization resolves an issue with the AG’s office, the entire
procedure is likely to stay confidential. That is good for the
organization involved because it suffers none of the reputational harm
that public disclosure—and embarrassing press—brings. But for the
170. A surprising number of published opinions conclude that plaintiffs lack standing
to sue. See Wisdom v. Centerville Fire Dist., Inc., 391 F. App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2010); Kidwell
ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Askew v. Trs. of the Gen. Assembly
of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.
Pa. 2009); George Pepperdine Found. v. Pepperdine, 271 P.2d 600 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954);
O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398 (Md. 1994); Grand Council of Ohio v. Owens, 620
N.E.2d 234 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Lundberg v. Lascelles, No. 59178-9-I, 2007 WL 4157779
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2007).
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charitable community as a whole, that resolution is mixed. It is good
that organizations reform their activities to better carry out the goals of
the charitable sector. But it is unfortunate that there is so little
application of the law for charities to look to in measuring their own
compliance.
I know that the popular mantra both in and out of the nonprofit
world is transparency. But transparency is sometimes overrated.
Disclosure is desirable when it encourages individuals to comply with
the liability standards of the law and boosts a higher aspirational
standard of behavior.171 Transparency is not helpful where daylight
threatens the mission and public support for organizations
experiencing governance challenges. The public interest is served
when state regulators intervene as a problem develops at an
organization and design solutions with the organization that prevent
debacles.
Once the media has reported a problem, a constructive remedy is
unlikely. The shaming effects on individuals and organizations
involved are already part of the permanent and easily accessed record.
The only solution that really addresses the problem of media shaming
that protects charities and prevents mistakes made by fiduciaries is one
that precedes widespread publicity. The AG’s office needs to be
involved earlier, and its role needs to be more advisory and less
enforcing. While some charities officials already see their role this
way, it is important to institutionalize and endorse that role.
In the business context, we may be less worried about dumb
decisions because we are confident that the market will eventually
correct them. In the charity context, we should be more concerned
about any interim waste of charitable resources, along with the fact
that there is no ultimate market correction for governance missteps.
While AGs should not act as super-trustees of nonprofit organizations,
charities bureaus are in the business of maximizing benefits for the
charitable sector. They know about conserving charitable assets, and
they work within the framework of the law and its norms of fairness.
For the protection of the sector as a whole and its reputation for
doing good, we need a procedure that minimizes both real mistakes
and opportunities for public embarrassment that do not translate into
public benefits. Any enforcement that punishes following a breach is
171. The questions about governance on Form 990 might signal the aspirational
standard. The sector itself can also offer such standards. See Strengthening Transparency
Governance Accountability of Charitable Organizations, PANEL ON NONPROFIT SECTOR 90-91
(June 2005), http://www.neh.gov/files/divisions/fedstate/panel_final_report.pdf.
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inferior to a mechanism that can prevent such a breach. The
administration of the law needs to be more proactive because the
media is likely to become more powerful, more ubiquitous, and more
decentralized. Greater government participation is necessary to
recalibrate the balance between private punishments and public law.

